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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PICKETING BY AN UNCERTIFIED UNION: THE NEW
SECTION 8(b)(7)*
THE union picket line, traditionally one of labor's most potent weapons in
its competitive struggle with management, was subjected by Congress to new
federal controls in the 1959 amendments to the national labor acts.' Together
with other forms of concerted union activities, picketing was free from federal
*An earlier version of this Comment was submitted in satisfaction of the writing re-
quirement of the Yale Law School's Divisional Program, Labor Law Division, 1959-1960.
The Law JorLnzd wishes to thank Professors Clyde NV. Summers and Harry H. Welling-
ton for bringing this paper to the Editors' attention.
1. The Labor-Wanagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), § 704
(c), 73 Stat. 544, 29 U.S.CA. § 158(e) (Supp. 1959), added a new union unfair labor
practice, § 8(b) (7), to the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 8, 49 Stat. 449
(1935), as amended, Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act 61 Stat. 141
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958):
[8(b) (7)] to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be
picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an emp!oyer
to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his em-
ployees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select
such labor organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such
labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees:
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this Act
any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may not
appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of this Act,
(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under section
9(c) of this Act has been conducted, or
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition, under section
9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from
-the commencement of such picketing: Prozided, That when such a petition has been
filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions of section 9(c) (1)
or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor or-
ganization, direct an election in such unit as the 'Board finds to be appropriate and
shall certify the results thereof: Provided further, That nothing in this subpara-
graph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer
does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless
an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other person
in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or
not to perform any services.
Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which would
otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section 8(b).
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.
C.A. §§ 153, 158-60, 187, 401-531 (Supp. 1959), is hereinafter cited as the LMRDA fol-
lowed by the session law section.
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court injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 2 and the Wagner
Act of 1935.3 But there has been a growing Tecognition that, in some contexts,
picketing is potentially destructive of the climate for collective bargaining and
free unionism which it was the purpose of the federal legislation -to create.
One -such context is that in which a picket line is conducted by a union which
-has not been "ecognized as a 'bona fide bargaining representative 'by the em-
ployer picketed nor 'by a majority of his employees. 4
Attempts to identify the situations in which picketing by an unrecognized
union is sufficiently destructive to warrant prohibition 'have for some years
been made under the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Section 8(b) (4) ('C) of that
act, by its terms, prohibits picketing when another union is currently certified
by the NLRB as the bargaining representative of -the employees of the em-
ployer picketed. 5 And the NLRB 'held in a few cases beginning in 1957-al-
though these 'holdings were reversed 'by the Supreme Court in the 1959 term
-that picketing 'by a nonrecognized union may sometimes constitute a viola-
tion of section 8(b) (1) (A) by restraining employees in the exercise of their
right to .refrain from union participation." But the widely held view that these
provisions of Taft-Hartley were inadequate to remedy the abuses of picketing
2. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958).
3. National Labor Relations Act §§ 1, 7, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, § 101, 61
Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1.958).
4. Widespread recognition of these abuses resulted from the findings and hearings of
the McClellan Committee, which, in its Interim Report, concluded that:
The weapon of organizational picketing has been abused by some of the unions
studied.
(a) They have used this device to extort-funds from management.
(b) They have used it without the consent of the employees of the picketed plant
and before some or any of them have indicated a desire to join the union in ques-
tion.
(c) They have ignored orderly NLRB processes available to them for lawful
and peaceful organizing methods.
Interim Report of the Select Commnittee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Manage-
ment Field, S. REP. No. 1417, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1958).
5. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(b) (4) (C), 61 Stat. 141 (1947) (now § 8(b)
(4) (C), as amended, LMRDA § 704(a)).
6. Local 639, Teamsters Union ('Curtis Bros.), 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957), enforcement
denied, 274 F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir. 1958), denial aff'd, 362 U.S. 274 (1960). For various
applications of the Curtis doctrine, see Bernhard-Altman Texas Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 1289
(1959) ; United Transports, 123 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 43 L.R.R.M. 1503 (1959) ; Lodge 311,
IAM (Machinery Overhaul), 121. N.L.R.B. 1176 (1958), cert. denied in advance of D.C.
Cir. judgment, 361 U.S. 881 (1959); Local 182, Teamsters Union, 121 N.L.R.B. 315
(1958), modified, 272 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. ,1959); Local 1232, Paint Makers Union (Andrew
Brown), 120 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1958); Local 511, United Rubber Workers (O'Sullivan
Rubber), 121 N.L.R.B. 1439 (1958), enforced, 269 .F2d 694 (4th Cir. 1959), reed per
curiam, 28 U.S.L. WEEK 3294 (U.S. April 4, 1960) ; Lodge 942, IAM (Alloy Mfg.), 119
N.L.R.B. 307 (1957), mwdified, 263 F.2d 796 (9th Cir.), enforcement stayed in part pend-
ing appeal, 265 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1959); International Union of Operating Engineers
(Shepard Machinery), 119 N.L.R.B. 320 (1957).
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by a nonrecognized union was reinforced by the 1958-1959 hearings of the
McClellan Committee.7 Coupled with increased sentiment in favor of redress-
ing the balance of power between labor and management, these hearings
afforded strong impetus for the legislative response culminating in the 1959
amendments. The amendments, which present complex problems of interpre-
tation, are currently being tested in a flurry of new decisions by the NLRB
and the courts. This Comment will seek to analyze and evaluate section 8(b)
(7), which makes certain picketing -by a nonrecognized union an unfair labor
practice, and an amendment to section 10(l),8 which provides for mandatory
injunctions against unfair labor practice picketing.
The Preamble to Section 8(b)(7)
Section 8(b) (7) is divided into two parts: a preamble which describes
generally the union activity comprehended by the section, and, second, three
specific situations in which such activity is prohibited. The preamble states:
[It shall be an unfair labor practice] to picket or cause to be picketed, any
employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to
recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his
employees, or forcing or requiring -the employees of any employer to ac-
cept or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining rep-
resentative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the
representative of such employees. 9
Before union activity may be examined in 'light of 8(b) (7)'s specific provi-
sions, it must first pass through the screening process required by the language
of the preamble. An attempt will therefore be made to ascertain which union
activities will survive this process. At the outset, it should be noted that the
preamble taken alone places no prohibitions on union activity.
The Meaning of "Picket"
For the first time in the history of the national labor acts, the 1959 amend-
ments include the term "to picket." Taft-Hartley reached any concerted union
activity which achieved a prohibited result; picketing was not singled out for
special treatment.'0 The act did not contain that term, and none of the deci-
sions under the act turned upon a characterization of union activity as picket-
ing. But section 8(b) (7) can be invoked only when "picketing" is present.
Neither previous case law nor expressions of congressional intent would seem
to afford substantial guidance to the NLRB and the courts in defining this
term. Indeed, the congressional proceedings indicate no awareness that the new
section poses this threshold definitional problem.
7. Hearings Before the Select Committee on Improper Acti4ies in the Labor or Man-
agement Field, 85th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1958).
& LMARDA §704(d).
9. LMRDA § 704(c).
10. See, e.g., Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(b) (4), 61 Stat. 141 (1947) (now
§ 8(b) (4), as amended, LMRDA § 704(a)).
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American dabor law would afford many -precedents for an expansive defini-
tion of picketing. Although the etymology of the term, Tooted in the analogy
to a picket fence," would seem to require a line of union men adjacent to the
premises of the employer, the general view of the common-aw courts was that
any union activity having an effect like that of the -traditional picket line was
to 'be classified as picketing.12 For example, visitation of nonstriking employees
in their homes by union men has tbeen dabelled picketing.13 The "like effect"
definition might be caried across to section 8(b) (7)'s use of the word "picket-
ing." For example, one of the effects of picketing which seemed most to con-
cern ,Congress was the stoppage of supplies and deliveries to the employer. 14
If -there were a voluntary interunion agreement not to cross each other's picket
lines, one union might put up a "constructive" picket by notifying other unions
of their dispute, using some form of communication other than the picket line,
such as the telephone, or a -poster placed near the employer's premises.1 Since
the -telephone campaign would produce the same -result as a formal picket line,
it might also be considered "picketing."
But the term picketing as employed in 8(b) (7) would seem intended to
refer to a narrower range of activity. The common understanding of that term,
more readily imputable to Congress, is a group of men bearing signs and
patrolling in the immediate vicinity of the employer's premises to discourage
employees and others from entering upon 'those premises. Abuses of picketing
referred to in the legislative history relate to the traditional device of putting
up a picket line around the employer's establishment. 10 And by referring to
"publicity other than picketing"' 7 in the 1959 amendments, Congress seemed
to regard "picketing" as a specific kind of publicity, focusing, it would seem,
on the form rather than the result of such publicity.
The distinction between picketing and "other publicity" might be given con-
tent by reference to the Supreme Court's attempt to distinguish picketing from
forms of speech protected by the first amendment. Indeed, Congress might
have made the distinction in order to avoid the constitutional objections voiced
in Thornhill v. Alabama.'8 In the course of its famous "'retreat"'0 from Thorn-
11. WEBSTER, NEv INTmNATiONAL DiCrioNARY (2d ed. 1947).
12. See Annot., 83 A.L.R. 200 (1933).
13. State v. Personett, 114 Kan. 680, 220 Pac. 520 (1923).
14. See text accompanying notes 102-03 infra.
15. See, e.g., Phillips v. Garment Workers Union, 45 L.R.R.M. 2363 (M.D. Tenn.
1959).
16. For a typical discussion of the practices occupying congressional attention, see
105 CoNG. REc. 571 (daily ed. April 24, 1959) (Sen. McClellan).
17. Second proviso to the new 8(b) (4). LMRDA § 704(a).
18. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). In Local 10, Journeyman's Plumbers
Ass'n v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192, 202 (1953), Justice Douglas, dissenting, cited Thornhill
for the proposition that "picketing is a form of free speech-the workingman's method of
giving publicity to the facts of industrial life. As such it is entitled to constitutional pro-
tection."
19. For an account of this "retreat," see Samoff, Picketing and the First Amendment:
"Full Circle" and "For7mal Surrender," 9 LAB. L.J. 889 (1958).
1396 [Vol. 69':1393
SECTION 8(b)(7)
hill, the Court assumed picketing to be something "more -than free speech."
Justice Douglas first suggested -this line of thought on the Court by stating:
Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it in-
volves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket
line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the
nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence those aspects of
picketing make it the subject of restrictive regulation....--0
Implicit in this statement is a recognition of the coercive and perhaps irrational
appeal of the picket line 2 _-an appeal stemming not from an articulation of
ideas but from "the very presence of a picket line."22 This appeal, by a process
of elimination, must result from the face-to-face quality of a union picket line,
the conspicuous and physical confrontation of nonpicket with picket. This con-
frontation invokes convictions or emotions sympathetic with the union activity,
fear of retaliation if the picket is defied, the loyalty of nonpickets who are
union members, simple embarrassment, or other similar reactions. Underlying
all of these responses is an element of intimidation resulting from the physical
presence of the pickets or the heritage of the union picket line tainted with
bloodshed and violence. The fact that some picket lines may rely for their
effectiveness upon voluntary observance by other unions does not necessarily
diminish the importance of confrontation. The presence of pickets will make
certain that the picket is brought to the attention of the individual member and
will ensure that the agreement not to cross is (honored.
A definition of picketing which takes account of the Supreme Court's view
would seem to require two, and only two, essential elements: 1) a union man
or men reasonably identifiable as such; 2) located within the immediate vicni-
.ty of the employer's premises. This definition recognizes that modem day
picketing need not necessarily conform to the popular image of a numerous
line of men carrying signs. Since picketing today is no longer necessarily or
even often associated with violence or physical restraints, the number of men
employed would seem irrelevant; a single man properly placed can often
achieve the desired confrontation and notification. And the carrying of signs
does not seem essential to picketing since a definition so limited would be open
20. Local 802, Teamsters Union v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942) (concurring
opinion). In Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464 (1950), the Court said: "But
while picketing is a mode of communication it is inseparably something more and differ-
ent"
21. For support and criticism of this assumption see Jones, Picketing and Coercion:
A Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 VA. L. Rsv. 1023 (1953) ; Gregory, Picheting and Coer-
cion: A Defense, id. at 1053; Jones, Picketing and Coercion: A Reply, id. at 1063; Greg-
ory, Picketing and Coercion: A Conclusion, id. at 1067.
22. See also Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950):
Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may convey the same
information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a picket line. But the
very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces consequences,
different from other modes of communication. The loyalties and responses evoked
and exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by printed word.
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to circumvention by use of such easy substitutes as the distribution of circu-
lars, the wearing of identifying apparel, or oral announcements; so long as the
man or men are reasonably identifiable as pickets, the necessary confrontation
and notification will occur. The element of proximity to the employer's premises
also seems necessary. If the union patrols at the end of a block of several
stores, only one of which is 'being "picketed," the person entering the picketed
store would not necessarily be aware that he was "crossing" and the union
would not necessarily observe the "crossers."
If this definition of "picketing" is applied under section 8(b) (7), union
publicity wiich does not contain the two essential ingredients would fall out-
side the prohibitions of that section. Thus, the district court in Phillips v. In-
ternational Ladies Garment Workers Union erred in issuing a temporary in-
junction against union picketing after finding that:
The picketing consisted of the posting of the various signs with inscrip-
tions set out hereinabove, on public property at a point designated by the
Nashville Police Department, and such signs were on stands similar to
ones -that might be carried by an ambulatory picket, but such picketing
from the beginning of May, 1959, had never been carried, but was posted
in the manner described and such signs were never carried by an ambu-
latory picket.23
The Meaning of "Forcing or Requiring"
Section 8(b) (7) contains language which arguably excludes some picketing
from its operation, that is, picketing which does not have "an object of forc-
ing or requiring" either 'the employer or his employees. Inclusion of this lan-
guage by the draftsmen could 'be taken to indicate that the section excludes
picketing which 'has an object, say, of persuading or requesting.2 4 However,
in light of the previous interpretation of "forcing or requiring" in other sec-
tions of Taft-Hartley, it would seem impossible to accept such a reading. These
terms appeared in section 8(b) (4) of Taft-Hartley. Their meaning was never
given explicit consideration when applied to picketing. In iact, -both the NLRB
and the courts adopted the assumption, often implicitly, that all picketing in-
herently forces or requires,2 3 and this assumption seems proper. Furthermore,
23. 45 L.R.R.M. 2363, 2364 (M.D. Term. 1.959).
24. At least one commentator has raised this question. Dunau, A Preliminary Look
at Section 8(b) (7), 48 GEo. L.J. 37.1, 373 (1959).
25. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(b) (4) (C), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (4) (C) (1958), prohibits certain union activity which has "an object" of "forc-
ing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with" the union. The Board has
yet to direct any analytical attention to "forcing or requiring." Rather, attention has al-
ways been directed to whether the union's picketing has the prohibited "object." It seems
clear that the Board has assumed picketing inherently to force or require. See, e.g., Local
745, Dallas Gen. Drivers, 118 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1253, 1259-60 (1957); Bonnaz Local 66
(Gemsco), '111 N.L.R.B. 82, 88-90 (1955). Even when the courts have refused to enforce
a Board determination that union picketing violated 8(b) (4) (C), there was no discussion
of whether the picketing had an object of forcing or requiring but only whether it had an
object of recognition. See, e.g., Douds v. Local 155, Knitgoods Workers', 148 F. Supp.
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the Supreme Court -has emphasized that picketing is something "more than
free speech" ;26 the something of picketing must be an element of compulsion
-of forcing or requiring.
What "Objects" of Picketing Are Comprehendcd [Fithin 8(b)(7)?
By its terms, the statute seems to comprehend picketing only when it has
one of two expressly defined objects: 1) forcing or requiring "an employer to
recognize or bargain with a labor organization" (commonly known as "recog-
nition" picketing), or 2) forcing or requiring "the employees of an employer
to accept or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining repre-
sentative" (commonly known as "organizational" picketing). Although the
difference between objects 1) and 2) would seem virtually impossible to as-
certain in most picketing situations, .this dual statement of proscribed objects
serves -the very useful function of eliminating the necessity, which has plagued
the Board and courts under other sections of the act, of making the "recog-
nitionar'-"organizational" distinction.2 7 It could be contended that picketing
for other objects, which do not fall within these two as defined, may be carried
on without potential 8(b) (7) restraints. Thus the section would not affect
-picketing which has as its exclusive object a protest against certain policies and
acts of an employer--such as payment of lower than union wage levels, an
unfair labor practice, discontinuance of certain facilities or services which pro-
vide employment, choice of plant location, or use of labor saving methods of
operation. Perhaps the most dramatic union object which might be excluded
is so-called "sweatshop" picketing, constituting union protest against uncon-
scionably low wage levels threatening the competitive position of rival em-
ployers who employ union labor.2 8
As interpreted by NLRB decisions under Taft-Hartley, however, the two
objects specified in 8(b) (7) are broad enough to comprehend "sweatshop"
and most other picketing. Under section 8(b) (4) (C) of Taft-Hartley, which
reaches picketing with an object of "forcing or requiring any employer to
recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization""--language which
duplicates the first object in 8(b) (7)-the Board has held that picketing to
protest substandard wages paid under a contract with an incumbent union is
enjoinable as a violation of that sectionao The Board's view was that, even
615, 617 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Douds v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 224 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.
1955).
26. See note 22 supra.
27. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 245 F.2d 542, 548 (2d Cir. 1957).
28. Throughout the hearings, Senator Kennedy kept pressing the view that whatever
the picketing provision enacted, it should allow "sweatshop" picketing. See, e.g., Hcarings
on S. 505, S. 748, S. 76, S. 1002, S. 1137 & S. 1311 Before the Subcomnmittcc on, Labor of
the Senate Committee on Labor atd Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 105-06 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as 1959 Hearings].
29. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(b),(4) (C), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (4) (C) (1958).
30. District Lodge 24, IAM (Industrial Chrome Plating), 121 N.L.RB. 1293 (1958).
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though the picketing union could not have been recognized in the presence of
a certified union, its ultimate object was recognition since its demands were of
a nature which are normally made through the collective bargaining process.
This reasoning has also 'been applied in Board decisions which grant the pick-
eted employer's request for a representation election; such elections can be
ordered only if the picketing union has demanded recognition."' It could be
argued that the use of language in section 8 (b) (7) equivalent to that in 8(b)
(4) evidences congressional intent to adopt the rationale of these decisions in
the new statute. In addition, it could be contended that contrary reading of
8(b) (7), excluding picketing with certain objects such as protesting substand-
ard wages, would plunge the Board and courts into a morass of rulings, which
would turn upon such unreliable and self-serving criteria as the wording of the
picket signs and statements of union officials, on the issue of whether the pick-
eting was for a proscribed object.3
On the other 'hand, these decisions were not thoroughly litigated in the
courts and 'have been disapproved of by legal commentators on the ground that
'they do violence to the explicit statutory language.33 Statements in the legis-
lative history, moreover, indicate that at least unfair labor practice picketing is
not comprehended by section 8(b) (7).3' Furthermore, even if the Board prop-
erly read "object" broadly in 8(b) (4) (C), such a reading is not necessarily
proper with respect to 8(b) (7) since the latter provision applies to picketing
in a much wider variety of fact situations, for example, picketing by a recog-
nized -but uncertified union. 35 In sum, it would seem proper to allow the union
to prove that its picketing does not have one of the two objects defined in
8(b) (7). Admittedly, whenever the picketed employer's employees are not
organized or do not have a certified 'bargaining representative, the union's
'burden of proof will be a heavy one, but this is no reason to deny the oppor-
tunity.3 6
31. Carter Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1609 (1958); Francis Plating Co., 109 N.L.R.B.
35 (1954); Red Robin Stores, 108 N.L.R.B. 1318 (1954); Smith's Hardware Co., 93
N.L.R.B. 1009 (1951).
32. For example, it would raise the problem of a union's disclaiming a once professed
recognitional object. See, e.g., Dep't Store Employees (Lane Bryant San Francisco), 121
N.L.R.B. 688 (1958).
33. Cox, The Lantruns-Griffin Amenddments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44
MINN. L. REv. 257, 266-67 (1959) ; Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 1086, 1105 (1960).
34. Under our substitute proposal [8(b) (7)] . .. a union would be allowed to picket
an employer who has committed unfair labor practices.
105 CONG. RE c. 15900 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1959) (Senator Kennedy). See also 1959 Hear-
ings at 105-06 (sweatshop picketing).
35. See notes 37-40 infra and accompanying text.
36. For cases demonstrating that a union can construct a record of its activity that
will sustain such a burden, see Radio Broadcast Technicians Union, 123 N.L.R.B. No. 55,
43 L.R.R.M. 1464 (1959); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n (Montgomery Ward), 122 N.L.R.B.
1264 (1959) ; Baltimore Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 108 N.L.R.B. 1575 (1954).
1400 (Vol. 69:1393
SECTION 8(b)(7)
The Immunity of "Certified" Unions
The concluding clause of the preamble excludes from the operation of 8(b)
(7) picketing undertaken by a union which is currently certified by the NLRB
as the employees' bargaining xepresentative. Certification may be obtained only
pursuant to an election held under Board supervision and consists of a certifi-
cate signed by an appropriate Board official that the union received a majority
of votes cast ar It is normally valid until either the local union becomes defunct
or until the certified -union loses a subsequent representation or decertification
election,38 which may not 'be held until at least one year after the certification
election.3 9 Thus, even if the picketing union represents a clear majority of the
employees, it will not be immune from section 8(b) (7) unless it has gone
-through the additional formality of being certified. This represents a significant
change from the rule enunciated by the Board in the picketing cases decided
under 8(b) (1) (A) of Taft-Hartley, in which a majority union was immune
before it had been certified, or when, because of noncompliance with the non-
communist affidavit requirement, 40 certification was not possible.4 ' With the
1959 elimination of this affidavit requirement,4 "noncomplying" unions, al-
though recognized, would be well advised to obtain certification before under-
taling picketing which might become vulnerable to an 8(b) (7) complaint.
"Currently certified" in this concluding clause admits of two possible inter-
pretations. Traditionally, certification is viewed as perpetual in the absence of
an intervening election.43 On the other hand, it might be argued that a union
is "currently certified" for 8(b) (7) purposes only so long as Board rulings
prohibit an election challenging its status as certified bargaining representative
(the certification or contract-bar rule) Y According to this view, an incumbent
37. NLRB, Statements of Procedure, Rules and Regulations, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. §
102.69(b) (Supp. 1960).
38. The majority status of the certified union is conclusively presumed for one year
after the date of certification and "indefinitely thereafter until such status is shown to have
ceased." United States Gypsum Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 964, 965 (1950). See generally Koretz,
Miohrity Presure Vis-A-Vis Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 2 SvnAcuse L REv.
294 (1951.); Note, Duration of the Certification Period Under Section 8(b)(4)(C) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, 9 SYRAcusE I- REv. 64 (1957).
39. The "election bar" rule of Taft-Hartley prohibits Board elections for one year
after a "valid election!' Labor-Management Relations Act § 9(c) (3), 61 Stat. 144 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (1958). Also, the Board has adopted a "certification bar" rule
which prohibits elections for one year after the date of certification of a union as majority
representative. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); General Box Co., 82 N.L.R.B.
678, 681-82 (1949).
40. Labor-Management Relations Act § 9(h), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h)
(1958).
41. The Curtis doctrine, see note 6 supra and accompanying text, was only applicable
to minority unions.
42. LMRDA § 201(d).
43. See note 38 supra.
44. See note 39 supra, and note 58 infra.
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union would be immune from 8(b) (7) only during the period presently pro-
vided by those rules.
A number of arguments might be advanced for the restrictive definition of
"currently certified." Certification is significant only because it is -regarded as
proof that the union represents a majority of -the employees.4  It is the fact of
majority status which entitles the certified union, under other sections of the
act, to certain 'benefits, such as the obligation of the employer to 'bargain with
it in good faith.40 After the certification-bar period of one year has expired,
'however, the presumption of majority status is withdrawn in certain circum-
stances. The employer can refuse to bargain with a certified union after ex-
piration of the certification year if he has a "good faith doubt" as to -the con-
tinued existence of the union's majority status. 47 He can also file a section 9(c)
representation election petition after the certification year if the union con-
tinues -to demand recognition.48 It could be argued 'by analogy that a certified
union's immunity from section 8(b) (7) is also based on its majority status,
and -that -the presumption of its majority status should end after a year. Thus
the employer would be able to invoke 8(b) (7) against picketing 'by a certified
union if he had good faith doubt of its majority status, or if he could prove
that the union no longer represented a majority.40 This result may be dictated
by the act's policy of protecting an employer and 'his employees against picket-
ing by a minority union. Allowing the union to picket until it could 'be formally
decertified pursuant to a 9(c) election-on the average, 110 days 0-would
frustrate that policy. In general, the reasoning would be that a minority union
should not 'be afforded greater opportunity to picket because it was once certi-
fied as a majority 'bargaining representative.
On the other hand, there is some support for the view -that, under section
8(b) (7), the NLRB should abide by the long-standing rule that a union is
"currently certified" until some formal act of decertification occurs or until the
union becomes defunct. This Tule was adopted by the Board in cases arising
under 8(b) (4) (C) of Taft-Hartley. The Board reasoned -that even though the
certified union may represent only a minority of the workers, -there is a formal
procedure for unseating it through a section 9(c) decertification election, and
that procedure should be followed. r1 And there is nothing in the legislative his-
tory of the new amendments indicating congressional disapproval of this treat-
45. See note 38 supra.
46. National Labor Relations Act § 8(5), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5)
(1958); see In re Mengel Co., Fibre Container Div., 80 N.L.R.B. 705 (1948).
47. Vulcan Steel Tank Corp., 106 N.L.R.,B. 1278 (1953); Celanese Corp., 95 ,N.L.R.13.
664, 671-73 (1.951).
48. Calcasieu Paper Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1954).
49. Presumably the certified union could preserve its immunity from 8(b) (7) by
proving that it still had a majority.
50. Report of the Advisory Panel on Labor-Management Relations Law to Senate
Labor Committee on Organization and Procedures of NLRB, 45 LAD. RIX. RE. 335
(1960) thereinafter cited as Report of the Advisory Panel].
51. Lewis Food Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 890 (1956); cf. United States Gypsum Co., 90
N.L.R.B. 964 (1950). See generally Note, 9 SYR cusE L REv. 64 (1957).
1402 [Vol. 69:1393
SECTION 8(b)(7)
ment of certification. Moreover, since another section of 8(b) (7) specifically
,incorporates the certification bar,52 the absence of that word in the preamble
may indicate that the draftsmen there meant "certification" in its traditional
sense. The analogy -to the employer's ability to refuse to bargain or to force the
union to another election after the expiration of the certification year is imper-
fectsince those capabilities give the employer much dess power than would the
view of 8(b) (7) suggested; expiration of certification privileges in the former
case only relieves the employer of an affirmative duty to bargain and does not
give him a weapon with which to curb the union's economic power.
PICKETING OF AN EMPLOYER WITH AN EXISTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
RELATIONSHIP OR WITHIN ONE YEAR OF AN ELECTION:
8(b) (7) (A) AND 8(b) (7) (B)
Both Taft-Hartley and the new 8(b) (7) reflect congressional desire to cir-
cumscribe picketing most scrupulously when the employer is already bargain-
ing with a union legitimately Tepresenting his employees. In this situation, the
employer and his employees have a justifiable interest in remaining free from
harassment by a rival union seeking to oust the incumbent,r s and rival unions
have only an attenuated interest in appealing to the employer or his employees.
Subsection 8(b) (7) (A) prohibits picketing
where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this Act
any other labor organization and a question concerning representation
may not appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of this ActS"
The second clause of the subsection identifies, by reference to Board rules
under section 9(c), the nature of the employer's recognition of the incumbent
union which may serve to insulate him from picketing. For example, although
an employer may "recognize" a union by bargaining with it, by negotiating a
health and welfare plan, or by handling grievances only on referral from the
union, these acts of "recognition" would not prevent an interested party from
raising a question of representation under section 9(c)." Thus they would not
52. Section 8(b) (7) (A) specifically prohibits picketing "where .. . a question con-
cerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of this Act."
53. See, e.g., 105 CONG. R. 14203 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1959) (analysis of the Lan-
drum-Griffin bill by Representatives Thompson and Udall).
54. LfMRDA § 704(c).
55. Alone, these acts of "recognition" normally are not sufficient to invoke the con-
tract-bar rule, infra note 58. Bethlehem Steel Co., 95, N.L.R-B. 1508 (1951) (agreement
containing a no-strike, no-lock-out clause and pension and welfare plan not sufficient) ;
Independence Lumber & Mfg. Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1353 (1951) (health and welfare pro-
vision) ; Southern Heater Corp., 91 N.L.R.B. 1118 (1950) ("letter of understanding" be-
tween employer and union); Standard Oil Co. of Ind. (South Bend Div.), 56 N.LR.B.
1101. (1944) (union recognized as exclusive bargaining agent and agreement contained
a procedure for handling "questions which might arise"); Corn Products Ref. Co., 52
N.L.R.B. 1324 (1943) (agreement for recognition of union and a maintenance of member-
ship clause) ; Henry Weis Mfg. Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 511 (1943) (written recognition agree-
ment).
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afford a basis for an 8(b) (7) (A) charge. The only acts of recognition which
would meet this test are, first, the signing of a collective bargaining agreement
and second, certification of the results of a representation election in which the
union obtains a majority. 6 Under present Board rulings, which are not statu-
tory and can 'be altered as the Board sees fit, 7 the signing of a collective bar-
gaining contract normally forecloses a question of representation 'for two years
(the "contract -bar" rule) 58 and certification bars a question of representation
for one year (,the "certification bar" rule).r9
Subsection 8(b) (7) (B), wiich -has no previous parallel in the labor stat-
utes, prohibits picketing
where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under section
9(c) of tis Act has been conducted .... 6o
This subsection will presumably be invoked only when the employees have re-
jected unionization in a Board election, since, if any union obtains a majority,
certification will occur and subsequent picketing by Tival unions will be barred
under the certification-bar period under 8(;b) (7) (A). The subsection there-
fore takes cognizance 'for the first time of an employer interest, which may be
shared by many of 'his employees, in remaining free from union organizing
efforts even when he has not entered into a collective bargaining relationship
in accordance with the act. 1 This interest, it should be noted, may be in dero-
gation of collective bargaining and employee self-organization. The statute
apparently prohibits all picketing for one year, even picketing by a union other
than the one which lost the election. If the employees reject an undesirable
racketeering union they must forego for a full year their most effective means
56. To qualify, a contract must be a written, signed agreement of fixed duration, in-
cluding substantive terms and conditions of employment. Standard Oil Co., 63 N.L.R.B.
1223 (1945). On the certification bar, see note 39 supra.
57. Ford Motor Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 932, 934 (1951).
58. The present contract-bar rules are set forth in Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp &
Paper Mfrs., 121 N.L.R.B. 990, 992-93 (1958):
[A] valid contract having a fixed term or duration shall constitute a bar for as
much of its term as does -not exceed 2 years and ... any contract having a term
in excess of 2 years shall be treated, for the purposes of contract bar, as a contract
for a fixed term of 2 years .... [Clontracts having no fixed duration shall not be
considered a bar for any period.
The Board has altered the length of the contract bar five times. For a summary of these
changes, see Leedom v. IBEW, 45 L.R.R.M. 3005, 3008 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
59. See note 39 supra.
60. LMRDA § 704(c).
61. When the Labor Board conducts an election, all the employees have a free oppor-
tunity to indicate their choice of bargaining representative. If they vote not to be
represented by a union, their choice should be respected. For a union to picket their
employer after losing an election is to attempt to coerce the employees into support-
ing the union against their express desire. Therefore, the committee bill forbids
such picketing.
105 CONG. REc. 14203 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1959) (Representatives Thompson and Udall).
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of self-organization and of Tequiring the employer to enter into a bargaining
agreement with -them.
The effect of 8(b) (7) (A) and 8(b) (7) (B) is, therefore, to afford im-
munity from organization-recognition picketing in three different situations for
three different periods of time. When an employer signs a collective bargain-
ing agreement his shop is immune during the contract-bar period, probably for
two years. After an election in which the union obtains a majority, the shop
is immune for one year after final certification of the results. After an election
in which a majority of the employees reject union organization, the immunity
extends for one year from the date of balloting.62
These limitations on picketing must take into account the possibility that an
election or the signing of a contract may be a subterfuge designed to insulate
the shop from legitimate union organizing efforts. A "recognized" incumbent
union may be largely a management creation-a "company union"--and the
contract may be a sham-a "s-weetheart" contract. A losing election can be-
come a union-busting device for employers and a tactical weapon for rival
unions competing to organize the employer's shop. For example, in order to
halt a union organizing campaign, the employer may bring a bogus union to
the plant, start to picket, and file a petition for an election that will be ex-
pedited as demanded by 8(b) (7) (C). The Board must hold an election forth-
with and, with any luck, the employer will have an election before the organiz-
ing union has had a chance to muster enough votes to obtain a victory. Simi-
larly, a rival union which is lagging badly or has no immediate hope of obtain-
ing a majority may seek to preserve the shop for future organization by forc-
ing an election at a time when it is clear that the majority will vote nonunion.
Furthermore, outside groups may exert undue influence upon a representation
election or force employers to "recognize" a fictitious union in order to emp!oy
the picketing limitations of 8(b) (7) (A) or 8(b) (7) (B) to immunize a com-
munity from organization drives by undesired unions.m
When the union attempting to organize is on the scene at the time a mock
election is conducted, it can protect its position by contesting the election or by
filing an unfair labor practice complaint against the employer if he is involved."'
A more difficult problem will arise, however, when the organizing union arrives
after the subterfuge has been executed. In order to avoid section 8(b) (7), the
union must find some way of upsetting the existing recognition or certification.
If 8(b) (7) (A) "recognition" is based upon the making of a contract with
a "company union!' or a minority union, the statute provides an easy avenue of
62. The certification bar will normally last longer than one year after balloting, since
certification does not immediately follow the election. The average time interval between
direction of an election and certification is twenty-five days. When the results are cin-
tested, the delay is generally much longer. Report of the Ad-isory Panel 335.
63. See, e.g., P.D. Gwaltney, Jr., & Co., 74 N.L.RB. 371 (1947).
64. Normally the filing of an unfair labor practice charge will cause the NLRB to
postpone the election, see notes 132-33 infra and accompanying text, although this Board
rule may not be applied to elections held under § 8(b) (7) (C), ibid.
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challenge. Such "recognition" is an employer unfair labor practice under sec-
tion 8(a) (2).05 The 1959 amendment to section 10(l) provides that an 8(b)
(7) injunction may not be issued if the General Counsel has issued a section
8(a) (2) unfair labor practice complaint."0 Thus by filing an 8(a) (2) charge,
the union can secure a prior determination that picketing will not be enjoined
even though section 8(b) (7) does apply and an unfair labor practice proceed-
ing may be initiated against it. The statute seems to overcompensate at this
point, for it apparently allows the picketing union to continue picketing until
final adjudication of the 8(b) (7) complaint, on the average, more than a
year. 17 Even if the picketing union petitions for an election, 8 and then loses
,the election, the amendment to section 10(l) would still prevent the Board
from seeking to enjoin further picketing under 8(b) (7) (B) (within twelve
months of a "valid election"),69 since the 10(l) proviso prohibits all 8(b) (7)
injunctions during pendency of the 8(a) (2) complaint.
65. See, e.g., Dixie Bedding Mfg. Go. v. NLRB, 268 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1959);
District 50, UMW v. NLRB, 234 F.2d '565, 569 (4th Cir. 1956).
66. Labor-Management Relations Act § 10(l), 61 Stat. '149 (1947), as amended, LM-
RDA § 704(d).
67. A contested unfair labor practice case consumes an average of 475 days from the
filing of the charge to the Board decision; it takes an additional 396 days for the
typical case to reach the stage of an effective judicial decree compelling compliance
with the act.
Report of the Advisory Panel 335-36. Although § 704(d)i of the 1959 act gives priority
to adjudication of 8(b) (7) complaints, it has been estimated that 82% of all unfair labor
practices now have "priority" status, thereby rendering the priority status a dubious ad-
vantage. Address by Board Member Philip R. Rodgers, Sixth Annual Institute on Labor
Law, Dallas, Texas, October 29, 1959.
68. Under present Board rules, the picketing union would have to waive use of Its
8(a) (2) complaint as a ground for contesting the fairness of the election, 21 NLRB
ANN. REP. 66 (1956), but this waiver would not effect the existence of the unfair labor
practice complaint itself.
69. Although the present language of the 10(1) amendment leaves no room for inter-
pretation, it might 'be desirable for Congress to restrict its scope. This could be done by
making the amendment applicable only in the case of temporary restraining orders sought
under 8(b) (7) (A). This more limited prohibition on effective 8(b) (7) relief would allow
the Board to seek an injunction under 8(b) (7),(C) if the picketing union did not petition
for an election within a "reasonable time," see notes 134-37 infra and accompanying text,
or to seek an injunction under 8(b) (7) (B) after a "valid election" was held and the
picketing union lost. The difficulty with this interpretation, however, is the danger that
the unfair practices of the employer which gave rise to the 8(a) (2) complaint will con-
taminate -the election.
If the union is forced into an election either by an employer petition or by the threat
of an 8(b) (7) (C) injunction, it should be allowed to raise objections to the election based
on the 8(a) (2) complaint, and thus suspend certification of the result pending disposition
of the contest. Legislative history indicates that the union is to be allowed to picket dur-
ing the election contest. See text accompanying notes 85-86 infra. 'And if the election is
ultimately upset, of course, 8(b) (7) (B) could not be invoked.
The only other alternative seems to be an increased reluctance on the part of the Gen-
eral Counsel to issue 8(a) (2) complaints due to their drastic consequences. This might
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If an injunction is sought under 8(b) (7) (A) on the ground that the in-
cumbent union has been certified pursuant to a Board election, or under 8(b)
(7) (B) because a valid election has been held within the last twelve months,
the picketing union must attack the validity of the election in order to escape
a temporary injunction.70 A direct attack upon the election, similar to the
8(a) (2) attack upon recognition, seems precluded by the long-standing NLRB
rule that an election can be upset only if one of the parties to the election con-
tests it within five days of balloting.7 ' The only alternative open to the union,
therefore, is to put up a picket and then raise the invalidity of the election as
a defense when the 8(b) (7) complaint is filed against it.
The express language of the statute and its legislative history seem to per-
mit this defense. Subsection 8(b) (7) (A) prohibits picketing only when the
incumbent union has been "lawfully" recognized and 8(b) (7) (B) only when
there 'has -been a "valid" election. These two terms, the former of which had
no parallel in the Taft-Hartley precursor of 8(b) (7) (A),72 would be surplus-
age if a reexamination of the events surrounding the election were not allowed.
Secretary of Labor Mitchell took this view when he testified before the Senate
'subcommittee in behalf of the administration version of 8(b) (7) (A) ,3 which
differed from the language as enacted only in that it did not contain the word
"lawfully."7 4 Addition of the word "lawfully" in the final bill, unaccompanied
by any contrary statements of intent in the legislative history, reinforces the
Secretary's interpretation of the subsection. Therefore, if a certified election
would have 'been voidable under NLRB rules ", if it had been contested at the
be done by refusing the complaint in all but the most compelling cases, or by characteriz-
ing it as an 8(a) (1) complaint. If a temporary injunction is sought after issuance of an
8(a) (1) complaint, however, the union could argue that the protection of 8(a) (2) in
section 10(l) is meant to be available to the union whenever operative facts normally con-
stituting reasonable grounds to issue an 8(a) (2) complaint are present, and that the dis-
trict court properly can determine if the facts on the face of the 8(a) (1) complaint should
be characterized as an 8(a) (2) complaint.
70. It is possible that the union will be able to obtain an 8(a) (2) complaint when the
incumbent union recognized by the employer has been certified. Cf. Lewis Food Co., 115
N.L.R.B. 890 (1956).
71. NLRB: Statements of Procedure, Rules and Regulations, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. §
102.68 (Supp. 1960).
72. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(b) (4) (C), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), .9 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (4) (C) (1958), prohibits concerted activity whenever the incumbent union "has
been certified."
73. Secretary Mitchell stated that a "paper" local would not be "recognized in accord-
ance with this act!' He also stated:
8(b) (7) (A) would not be construed to prohibit recognition or organizational pick-
eting on a bare showing of recognition of the incumbent union, because, so con-
strued, the words "in accordance with this act" in that section would have no mean-
ing.
1959 Hearings at 417.
74. '105 CONG. REc. 1160 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1959).
75. "Conduct that creates an atmosphere which renders improbable a free choice will
sometimes warrant invalidating an election, even though that conduct may not constitute
an unfair labor practice." General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948).
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time of balloting, the election should not constitute either "lawful" recognition
under 8(b) (7) (A) or a "valid" election under 8(b) (7) (B).
It could be contended, however, -that -the language "valid election" does not
justify such a broad inquiry into prior elections even if "lawfully recognized"
does. This view is in accord with decisions interpreting section 9(c) (3)'s pro-
hibition on a second election within twelve months of a "valid election." In
those decisions, "valid election" has never been construed to allow reexamina-
tion of a prior election unless objections to -the election were raised within five
days of the balloting.7 6 The policy supporting this rule has been the desire for
administrative finality when the Board certifies election results.71 To allow the
union to reopen the election through the device of an 8(b) (7) defense would
carve out a significant exception to this policy. Nevertheless, a 'broader reading
of "valid election" than in 9(c) (3) cases may be justified 'by the fact that more
is at stake when the issue is raised in an 8(b) (7) (B) proceeding. The avail-
ability of picketing for self-organization and collective 'bargaining is of greater
importance to the union than a new election within a year.78 Moreover, since
-the organizing union can apparently attack a Board election under subsection
8(b) (7) (A) to prove that the incumbent certified union was not "lawfully
recognized," it seems anomalous to deny that union the right to attack elections
under 8(b) (7) (B) when a different phrase ("valid election") is used.
Some question may be raised concerning the proper procedure for adjudi-
cating the defenses asserted by the picketing union. Section 10 (1) provides
that the officer or regional director shall issue an unfair labor practice com-
plaint and seek a temporary injunction .if he has "reasonable cause to believe
such charge is true and that a complaint should issue.' 70 Presumably the re-
gional director could take evidence that the election relied upon to invoke sub-
section 8(b) (7) (A) was improperly conducted. Should he refuse to issue an
8(b) (7) complaint if he finds -reasonable cause to believe the allegations, or
should "reasonable cause" be interpreted to command issuance of the complaint
whenever some evidence of the unfair labor practice has been presented? Argu-
ably, since the defenses will often be in the nature of unfair labor practice
charges, an affirmative finding should not be made without full adjudication
and opportunity for hearing, procedures which would be foreclosed if the re-
gional director were -to refuse to issue the complaint. But requiring the or-
ganizing union to wait until final adjudication would render its defenses use-
less. Once -the complaint is issued, picketing will be enjoined for the duration
76. For Board interpretations of "valid election," see 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 25 (19,19).
77. 21 NLRB ArNN. REP. 73 (1956).
78. It should be noted, of course, that if the union were allowed to picket, it would
presumably also be allowed to obtain an election before the year expired pursuant to §
8(b) (7) (C). The added advantage to the union seems irrelevant, however, once the elec-
tion has been reopened.




of the adjudication;80 in most cases, the statutory 'bar will expire before the
adjudication is dosed.8 ' In any event, the delay will halt the organizing effort
at its most crucial point In sum, it seems preferable to allow the regional
director to consider allegations of an improper election when determining
whether there is "reasonable cause" to issue an 8(b) (7) (A) or 8(b) (7) (B)
complaint. Decisions at this level could be supervised by the General Counsel's
issuance of advisory memoranda and by the existing right of appeal to the
General Counsel 8 2 when complaints are denied.
If an 8(b) (7) (A) complaint is not issued because "unlawful" recognition
is found, the picketing may continue despite an employer's existing contractual
relationship with the incumbent union.s3 The continued picketing wvill fall ith-
in the terms of 8(b) (7) (C), which may require that an expedited election be
held in which the picketing union is pitted against the incumbent. If the picket-
ing union wins, it should probably be certified as collective bargaining repre-
sentative immediately, before the expiration of the contract or contract-bar
period.84
An interesting 8 (b) (7) (B) problem will arise in the following situation. A
union mounts an organizational drive against an employer which ultimately
culminates in an election, either an expedited election under 8(b) (7) (C) or
a normal 9(c) election. The union loses the election but contests the results
before certification is issued. If the union seeks to picket pending outcome of
the election contest, it is not dear whether subsection 8(b) (7) (B) would
apply; the court has no way of knowing whether a "valid election" has been
held. If 8(b) (7) (B) is 'held inapplicable, the union could picket with im-
punity until the Board has established the validity of the election, which may
require many months.8 5 But Secretary Mitchell had no doubts that the union
could continue to picket.86 This view seems necessary to safeguard the union's
organization campaign against employer unfair labor practices. Although con-
tinued picketing, particularly if it stopped deliveries and services, could be
ruinous to an employer, injunction of the picketing could cripple union or-
ganizing efforts because of the loss of momentum pending the election contest.
80. Section 704(d) of the 1959 act compels the regional director to seek a temporary
restraining order whenever an 8(b) (7) complaint is issued.
81. The statutory bar under 8(b) (7) is tvo years in the case of an existing contract,
and one year in the case of a valid election or certification. See text accompanying note
62 supra. Adjudication on the average takes between one and tvo years. See note 67 supra.
82. See23 NLRB ANx. REP. 3 (1958).
83. Secretary of Labor Mitchell, testifying before the Senate Committee on behalf of
the administration bill, stated that when a union made a sufficient showing that an in-
cumbent union was a "paper" local, a legitimate union could picket the employer for a
reasonable time. 1959 Hearings at 417.
84. For discussion of -the contract-bar rules, see note 58 supra.
85. Both 8(b) (4) (C) and 8(b) (7) (A) would afford no protection since the union is
not certified or recognized, and 8(b) (7) (C) cannot be invoked because its requirement
of filing for an election has been met.
86. 1959 Hearings at 42L
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The New Picketing Provisions and Section 8(b) (4) (C)
Section 8(b)(4)(C) of Taft-Hartley, 7 which is retained along with the
1959 amendments, may apply to many of the picketing situations covered by
the new 8(b) (7). The -ection applies to concerted union activity in general,
including picketing. It would make it an unfair labor practice to picket an em-
ployer whose employees are represented by a certified union when the object of
the picketing is to require the employer "to recognize or bargain with" the
picketing union. Since picketing is prohibited only when the incumbent union
has been certified, and then only when the objective of the picketing union is
"recognitional" as distinguished from "organizational," 8(b) (4) (C) dupli-
cates only a small portion of 8(b) (7). But where it does apply, 8(b) (4) (C)
may in some respects afford the employer greater protection than 8(b) (7)
(A) and 8(b) (7) (B). Protection normally will extend for a longer period of
time than the contract, certification, and election-bar periods guaranteed by
8(b) (7). It will extend until the incumbent union is affirmatively decertified. 88
This result follows from the fact the 8(b) (4) (C) does not incorporate the
certification-bar rule by stating, as does 8(b) (7) (A), that protection ceases
when a question concerning representation may appropriately be raised. Also,
8(b) (4) (C) may not allow the picketing union to resist inj unction by reopen-
ing events contemporaneous with the certification election; since its language
is not limited by reference to "lawful" or "valid" certification, the section could
apply whenever the formalities of certification have been complied with. Fur-
ther, an 8(b) (4) (C) complaint is invariably remediable by a temporary re-
straining order, whereas this remedy is not available under 8(b) (7) if there
is an outstanding 8(a) (2) ("company union") charge against the employer
picketed. 9 Finally, an 8('b) (4) (C) violation will subject the union to the
possibility of a civil damage action under Taft-Hartley section 303.90
Despite the greater restraints imposed by subsection 8(b) (4) (C), it is
doubtful that that section must give way to 8(b) (7) when picketing is in-
volved. The final proviso of section 8(b) (7) states:
Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which
would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section 8(b).91
87. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (C) (1958). The language of sub-
section (C) has remained the same but the preamble to 8(b) (4) has been amended to
render it more expansive. LMRDA § 704(a). For discussion of this change, see Cox,
supra -note 33, at 270-74.
88. Lewis Food Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 890 (1956).
89. Section 10(1) of Taft-Hartley orders the NLRB to seek a temporary restraining
order whenever an 8(b) (4) (C) complaint is issued, making no exceptions for cases In
which an 8(a) (2) complaint has been issued. 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1)
(1958). It is possible that a § 8(a) (2) complaint might be issued even though the union
has been certified. Cf. Lewis Food Co., supra note 88.
90. Labor-Management Relations Act § 303, 61 Stat. 158 (1947), as amended, LM-
RDA § 704(e).
91. LMRDA § 704(c).
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Thus the qualifications of subsection 8(b) (7) (A), as it applies to picketing
where a certified incumbent union is involved, will be irrelevant, since the per-
missibility of such picketing will be determined by reference to the more strin-
gent provisions of 8(b) (4) (C).
THE SECOND PROVISO AND THE COMPLEXITIES OF 8(b) (7) (C)
Subsection C, created in an atmosphere tense with bitter political debate and
maneuver-its draftsmanship an indelible tribute to that fact-promises to
generate as much controversy and confusion in the NLRB and the courts as
it did in Congress. Indeed, the initial court decisions indicate rapid fulfillment
of this promise. The subsection reads in full:
[It shall be an unfair labor practice to picket] ...
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under
section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed
thirty days from the commencement of such picketing; Provided, That
when such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without
regard to the provisions of section 9(c) (1) or the absence of a showing
of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an
election in such unit as -the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify
the results -thereof: Provided further, That nothing in this subparagraph
(C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an
employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor
organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual
employed by any other person in the course of -his employment, not to pick
up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services. 2
Tie Scope of the Second Proviso
The most important single problem raised by 8(b) (7) is the scope to be
accorded the second proviso of 8(b) (7) (C). Under subsection (A) and ( B
the presence of a certified or recognized union or the occurrence of an election
within the past year furnished reasons to prohibit picketing altogether. When,
under subsection (C), these factors were not present, Congress apparently in-
-tended -to curb only those forms of picketing which might lead to specifically
objectionable results. The breadth accorded to the second proviso, therefore,
must xeflect this legislative distinction between permissible and objectionable
forms of picketing.
Three divergent interpretations are possible. The first, which has been
adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and by other district
courts in the few cases decided so far, 3 will be described as the "narrow" in-
terpretation. It exempts from the prohibitions of 8(b) (7) (C) only a very
limited form of picketing---"informational" picketing-and it exempts this form
92. Ibid.
93. -McLeod v. Local 89, Chefs Union, Civil No. 26120, 2d Cir., July 6, 1960; Phillips
v. International Ladies Garment Workers, 45 L.R.M. 2363 (M.D. Tenn. 1959); Peaello
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of picketing only when it does not have what may -be called a "secondary" effect,
that is, the effect of stopping deliveries and services to the employer picketed.
Informational picketing may be defined as picketing which has only one pur-
pose, advising the public that -he employer is operating a nonunion shop; if the
picketing has an additional purpose, such as organizing or securing employer
recognition, it is no longer "informational." The second interpretation will be
described as the "broad" interpretation. This reading of the proviso would ex-
empt all picketing, even if recognitional or organizational, from the operation
of 8(b) (7) (C), so long as it does not have a secondary effect. Under the third
or "middle" interpretation, recognitional-organizational picketing would be ex-
empt, but only if the union could -show that the picket had no other purpose than
that of informing the public (workers and consumers). Like the other two in-
terpretations, the middle interpretation would not exempt picketing which has
an actual secondary effect, regardless of intent. The middle interpretation dif-
fers from the broad Teading in that picketing which has no secondary effect is
nevertheless not immunized if the union intended a secondary effect, a primary
effect (inducing employees of the picketed employer not to cross the picket
lines) or any other effect not within the "truthfully advising the public" clause
of the proviso.
To Teach the "narrow" interpretation a two step process of statutory con-
struction must -be made. First, the word "picketing" in the exempting clause
must be read as "picketing ... for the purpose of truthfully advising the public
etc.," so that picketing which is not "for the purpose of truthfully advising the
public" is not included in the exemption clause. Then, "for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public" must be interpreted to mean "for the sole,
single, and exclusive purpose of truthfully advising the public," so that picket-
ing which has any additional purposes cannot fall within the exemption clause.
The middle and broad interpretations accept the first step, finding that pick-
eting must ,be "for the purpose of truthfully advising the public" to be exempt.
Both, however, reject the view that an informational purpose must ,be distin-
guished from an organizational-recognitional purpose. It is ,reasonable to as-
sume that "picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public" is but an intermediate step to accomplish some further union objec-
tive. The union would not expend its resources on picketing which would not
achieve some end 'beyond providing information. Thus the word purpose must
refer to something less than -the union's ultimate goal. According to the middle
interpretation, "purpose" refers to the kind of economic pressure which the
union attempts to apply. Only attempts to enlist the aid of the general public,
and perhaps at-tempts to persuade workers to join the union, are permitted
(provided, of course, that they do not have a secondary effect). In addition,
v. Retail Store Employees Union, 45 L.R.R.M. 2726 (D.D.C. 1960) ; see Elliott v. Sapulpa
Typographical Union, 45 L.R.R.M. 2400, 2403 (N.D. Okla. 1959).
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the union must limit the substantive content of its public appeal to the objective
facts enumerated in the proviso.
The broad interpretation is reached by an even more expansive reading of
the "purpose" clause, one which distinguishes only between picketing with a
truthful, objective purpose and picketing which is argumentative or untrue. The
phrase "for the purpose of truthfully advising the public" could be replaced by
"which .truthfully advises the public." Thus the "purpose" clause is relegated
to the minor but important role of guaranteeing the substantive honesty of ex-
empt picketing, and the primary criterion of the picketing exemption becomes
the presence or absence of secondary effect.
The impact of the narrow interpretation is illustrated by a recent case,
Phillips v. International Ladies Garment Workers,4 involving a union attempt
to organize the cutting room employees of a Nashville plant. The employer
filed an 8(b) (7) (C) charge and the Regional Director of the Board issued a
complaint and sought a temporary restraining order in the federal district
court. Although the court made a specific finding of fact that the picketing did
not induce "any individual employed by any other person in the course of his
employment not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform
any services" for the employer," it nevertheless enjoined the picketing because
the union's purpose of organizing and obtaining recognition fell within the
definitions of the preamble. Had the court adopted the broad interpretation
of the second proviso, its finding that the picketing had no secondary effect
would have defeated the injunction. Under the middle interpretation, the court
would have -had to inquire further into the union's motives.
On -the basis of -the proviso's language alone, none of the interpretations
seems overwhelmingly correct. The only certain conclusion to be drawn from
the statement that exempt picketing must be "for the purpose of truthfully ad-
vising the public" is that picketing which has the contrary purpose of dissemi-
nating false or misleading information is not exempt. The narrow interpreta-
tion is reached only by inferring that purpose means "sole purpose," to the ex-
dusion of any added motive. Similarly, the middle interpretation requires the
inference that purpose means "sole purpose" within the context of tactical ob-
jectives.
Referring to legislative history, it becomes clear that the narrow interpreta-
tion is untenable, for it would restrict the 8(b) (7) (C) proviso more than Con-
gress intended. Section 8(b) (7) was adopted against the 'background of the
McClellan Tacketeering investigations and the revelations of union abuses made
in those hearings. The dominant concern of Congress was with "blackmail"
picketing ,by a minority union, forcing an employer and his employees into a
94. 45 LR.R.M- . 2363 (M.D. Tenn. 1959) ; see McLeod v. Chefs Local 89, 45 LR.
R.M. 2784 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
95. Phillips v. International Ladies Garment ,Vorkers, mtpra note 94, at 2364.
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bargaining relationship.06 Recognitional-organizational picketing for the pur-
pose of communicating with unorganized employees is unlikely to have this
coercive impact. Moreover, noncoercive picketing may be the only way which
union organizers have of communicating with such employees. Other mass
media will normally be too costly and will not be as well directed. Congress
demonstrated in the 1959 amendments that it recognized this essential element
of communication in picketing by twice linking picketing with "publicity" in
the -terms of the amendments.0 7 Rejection of the narrow interpretation is also
counseled by specific references to this problem in the legislative history.
Senator Kennedy's statement accompanying 8(b) (7) as submitted to the
Senate in final form, which has not been contradicted 'by any member of Con-
gress, said :
First. A union may use pickets in an effort to organize until there is an
election in which the NLRB can determine the employees' wishes. But a
union which is stopping truck deliveries or other employees would not be
allowed to avoid an election. Second. Picketing, in the absence of a con-
tract or an election, which has only the effect of notifying the public of
nonunion conditions, and asking the employees to join the union would
not be banned. 8
The -narrow interpretation of -the second proviso would prohibit picketing
which was "asking the employees to join -the union," even if deliveries or ser-
vices were not stopped.
A further argument against adoption of the narrow interpretation is the fact
that it renders the second proviso of 8(b) (7) (C) superfluous with regard to
-picketing. The preamble to 8(b) (7), which fixes the outer boundaries of that
seotion, mentions only picketing which has an object of recognition or organi-
zation. Any picketing which did not have a recognitional or organizational
96. It should be obvious that so long as racketeers and gangsters are permitted to use
such methods to force employees into their unions the legitimate trade union move-
ment is in jeopardy. The honest and forthright union organizer cannot hope to com-
pete with the organizer who uses such methods. When the weapons of coercion and
force are taken from the blackmail organizer, the legitimate union movement can
grow and expand in a healthy and wholesome way.
105 CONG. REc. 14195 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1959) (Rep. Griffin). See also id. at A8062
(daily ed. Sept. 12, 1959) (Rep. Barden); id. at 14183 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1959) (Rep.
Landrum).
97. The relevant portions of the second proviso of 8(b) (4) read:
Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing con-
tained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than& pick-
eting, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and
members of a labor organization . . .
LMRDA § 704(a). (Emphasis added.) Subsection 8(b) (7) (C) itself distinguishes be-
tween picketing and "other publicity."
98. 105 CONG. REc 15900 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1959). Other statements indicate that
the crucial distinction between picketing which will invoke § 8(b) (7) (C) and picketing
which is immune is the presence or absence of a secondary effect. See id. at 16636 (daily
ed. Sept. 4, 1959) (Rep. Thompson); id. at 16637 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1959) (Rep. Udall).
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purpose would a fortiori not be affected -by 8(b) (7). The narrow interpreta-
tion of 8(b) (7) (C), therefore, only repeats what is said in the preamble-
"picketing which does not have a recognitional or organizational purpose is not
prohibited."
The potential dangers of identifying the second proviso xith the recognitional-
organizational distinction of the preamble are illustrated by the recent Second
Circuit decision in McLeod v. Local 89, Chcfs Union." The union framed its
picket signs according to the directions of the proviso, stating inter alia that the
employer did not have a contract with a union. Reversing the district judge who
-had found that such statements evidenced a demand for recognition, the appel-
late court reasoned that the signs could not have had a recognitional purpose
because they were specifically allowed by the proviso which, according to the
court's interpretation, defines nonrecognitional picketing. Since the general pre-
amble to 8(b) (7) also demands a finding of recognitional-organizational pick-
eting, the court's finding that the union did not have such a purpose will im-
munize the union not only from -ubsection (C), but also from subsections (A)
and (B). Thus it will be possible for a union to escape operation of 8(b) (7)
altogether merely by complying with the second proviso to subsection (C). In
addition, courts may hesitate to find a "recognitional-organizational" purpose,
in order -to liberalize subsection (C). In McLeod, for example, the court ac-
cepted as evidence of nonrecognitional intent a letter of disclaimer filed by the
union after a three year organizational campaign-a tactic which has seldom
convinced the NLRB of a change of heart.10° By this decision, the court im-
munized the picketing not only from subsection (C), but from the 8(b) (7)
entirely.
If congressional intent to limit the proviso's immunity to noncoercive picket-
ing is determinative, the middle interpretation would seem most capable of
achieving that objective. While the actual stoppage of deliveries and services is
the most common means of exerting economic pressure, the mere threat of sec-
ondary work stoppage may.be equally coercive when the employer cannot afford
even the slightest interruption. Moreover, stopping secondary employees is not
the only means of closing down an employer. If the union is attempting to or-
ganize only one part of a multi-unit shop, the picket line may induce or threaten
to induce organized employees from other units to stop work. Since the broad
interpretation restricts the application of 8(b) (7) (C) to actual work stoppage
by secondary employees, it would fail to limit the proviso's exception to purely
noncoercive picketing.
On the other hand, statements from the congressional debates such as Senator
Kennedy's explanation quoted above seem to draw the line at actual work stop-
page, looking to the effect rather than the purpose of the union's picket. 10' And
99. Civil No. 26120, 2d Cir., July 6, 1960.
100. See, e.g., Department Store Employees (Lane Bryant San Francisco), 121 N.L
R.B. 688 (1958).
101. 'See note 98 sumra and accompanying text; note 108 infra and accompanying text.
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although inducing primary employees not to cross the picket lines may have as
coercive an impact as stopping secondary employees, the statements in debate
are concerned with secondary stoppage alone; indeed, the final clause of the
proviso distinguishes between primary and secondary work stoppage, so that
even under the middle interpretation an unintended secondary work stoppage
would be treated differently than an unintended primary stoppage. The appar-
ently permissive attitude toward primary work stoppage may have been inad-
vertent, for the particular examples of blackmail picketing exposed by the Mc-
Clellan committee involved use of secondary pressure. On the other 'hand, it
would have 'been consistent for Congress to decide that mutual aid and protec-
tion by fellow employees-activity expressly protected by section 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act-was not a form of economic coercion deserving
stricture under subsection (C). If the latter attitude may be ascribed to Con-
gress, interpretation of the proviso must be governed, not 'by the limited policy
to allow only noncoercive picketing, but rather by a policy exempting any pick-
eting which does not induce a secondary work stoppage.
Once the proviso is expanded to immunize picketing even though it may
cause or threaten primary work stoppage, the middle interpretation becomes
purposeless. While it still might be argued that picketing which 'has the purpose
of stopping secondary employees should not be granted imunity, recent NLRB
decisions hold that such picketing is already prohibited by the secondary boy-
cott provisions.Y0 2 The policies of 8(b) (7) (C) can adequately 'be served by
interpreting the second proviso to immunize all picketing which does not have
a secondary effect.
Other Publicity
It should be noted that inclusion of "other publicity" in the second proviso
to 8(b) (7) (C), whether that proviso is interpreted narrowly or broadly, does
not carry with it a negative inference that, outside of this exemption, such
activity may be enjoined if it otherwise meets the terms of 8(b) (7) (A), (B),
or (C). The "other publicity" clause 'seems to 'have been included in the pro-
viso by Congress in order to overrule earlier Board decisions which 'had en-
joined nonpicketing publicity ancillary to picketing when the picketing itself
was found to 'be an unfair labor practice' 03 The "other publicity" proviso
would ensure that an 8(b) (7) injunction runs only to the picketing. More-
102. See notes 147-51 infra and accompanying text.
103. The House Manager's report states that:
Section 8(b) (7) overrules the Curtis and Alloy cases to the extent that those de-
cisions are inconsistent with section 8(b) (7).
Statement of the Managers on te Part of the House, H.R. RE'. No. -1147, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., § 704(c) (1959). Apparently, these two cases were selected to illustrate the
effect of 8(b) (7). The unfair labor practice injunction in Alloy ran against the picketing
and the placing of the employer on the union's "We Do Not Patronize" list. Lodge 942,
IAM (Alloy Mfg.), 119 N.L.R.B. 307 (1957). 'Presumably the part of Alloy overruled
was the extension of the injunction to publicity activities other than picketing.
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over, publicity which is not "picketing" is not mentioned in the preamble to
8(b) (7), and thus could not be brought under that section.
The Secondary Effect
The second proviso requires a determination of the nature of the secondary
effect which will render picketing subject to 8(b) (7) prohibitions. The pro-
scribed secondary effect is described in these terms:
Unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed
-by any other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up,
deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services.
A picket may cause employees of another employer to refuse to work in several
ways. The picket line itself may persuade or coerce employees who come face
to face with the pickets at the premises of the employer. Work stoppage of
'this nature is clearly comprehended. But a picket line also serves as the tradi-
tional signal which identifies an open labor dispute. A union man in another
state reads in his union newspaper, not that a labor dispute exists at plant X,
but that Union A is picketing plant X. If this union man reacts to this news
'by sefusing to handle Brand X, either because of an agreement with Union A
or because of general sympathy for the union, should his refusal to work be
considered -a secondary effect for 8(b) (7) (C) purposes? Probably it should
not. The operative cause of work stoppage in this case is publicity of the labor
dispute, not the picket. If Union A 'had not picketed but simply placed a notice
of its dispute in -the union newspaper, presumably the secondary effect would
have been the same. To distinguish between these two effects, the proviso
could ,be construed to encompass only secondary work stoppages which occur
at the picketed premises, that is, refusals to cross the actual picket line. State-
ments in the legislative history seem to assume this interpretation, for they
refer only to work stoppage at the premises of the employer.1°4
Since the proviso refers to the "effect" of picketing, and not to the "object,"
the intentions of the union appear irrelevant to the determination of whether
picketing should 'be subject to 8(b) (7) (C). °1O This interpretation may afford
104. The amendments adopted by the conference allow organizational picketing up to
the time of an election, with the proviso that when such picketing results in overt
economic pressure-by stopping the flow of transportation, or through refusal of
other employees to cross a picket line-a prompt election is mandatory.
105 CONG. Rc. 16637 (daily ed. Sept 4, 1959) (Rep. Udall).
When the picketing results in economic pressure through the refusal of other em-
ployees to cross the picket line, the bill would require a prompt election.
105 CONG. Rc. 16636 (daily ed. Sept 4, 1959) (Rep. Thompson). See also text accom-
panying note -108 infra.
105. By contrast, the provisions of § 8(b) (4) of Taft-Hartley, 61 Stat. 141 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1958), refer to the "object" of the union's picketing, and the
NLRB has developed criteria by which it can be shown that the union's "object' was not
to induce secondary work stoppage. Compare Baltimore Bldg. & Trades Council, 103
N.L.R.B. 1575 (1954), writh Sailor's Union (Moore Drydock), 92 N.L.RB. 547 (1950).
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rival unions or the picketed employer an opportunity to thwart organization
campaigns which ordinarily would not have a secondary effect. To impede
Union A's campaign, Union B may instruct its local membership, some of
whom are deliverymen, not to cross A's picket line. On its face, the secondary
effect would appear to -take A's picketing outside the protection of the proviso;
A's innocent intent is irrelevant. Probably Union A will be unable to prove
Union B's intent, and that will end the matter. Even if the evidentiary prob-
lems can 'be surmounted, the effect of 8(b) (7) (C) is still not cldear. The Teal
cause of the secondary work stoppage appears to be the statute rather than the
picketing, for, absent the statute, Union B would have -tried to upset the A
campaign by crossing the picket line with impunity in order to reduce its
economic impact. But, to refuse to issue the 8(b) (7) complaint on these
grounds would leave the innocent employer and ,his employees subject to eco-
nomic damage which the proviso seeks to eliminate. A satisfactory solution
might be achieved if Union A can obtain a contemporaneous 8(b) (1) (A) 100
complaint against Union B, and if the General -Counsel will petition a district
court -to enjoin Union B from honoring A's picket line; -the 8(b) (7) (C) pro-
viso would then permit A's picketing since the picket no longer has a secondary
effect. This entire problem should not arise when -the employer solicits Union
B's action. Employer collusion, if proven, would be grounds for an 8(a) (2)
complaint which suspends injunctive relief under 8(b) (7).
The -fact that -the proviso employs the word "induce," and not "stop" or
"halt," may indicate that the picketing need not -result in an actual work stop-
page -by a secondary employee. The terms "induce or encourage" were used
in section 8(b) (4) of the Taft-Hartley Act, and in some situations the Board
held that a traditional union picket line constitutes an inducement to employees
to cease work, regardless of whether or -not any actual work stoppage
occurred. 1 7 But to invoke this doctrine in connection with the 8(b) (7) (C)
proviso would contradict its legislative history. In Senator Kennedy's state-
ment accompanying Senate Resolution 181, he said:
In other words, we say, in effect: "You can start picketing with any thing
you have, with any members you have; but if the picketing results in stop-
ping deliveries or service employees from entering the premises, then there
must be an immediate election.' ' 8
The 8(b) (7) (C) Expedited Election
When picketing is comprehended within 8(b) (7) (C) (that is, when it
passes the tests of the 8(b) (7) preamble and is not exempted by 'the second
106. Section 8(b) (1) (A), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1958),
provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for the union or its agents "to restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7 . . . ." One of the
rights under section 7 is "the right to self-organization." Application of § 8(b) (1) (A)
in these circumstances has -no precedent.
107. See, e.g., Bonnaz, Local 66 (Gemsco), 111 N.L.R.B. 82, 88 (1955). Compare
Douds v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 224 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1955).
108. 105 CONG. REc. 15900 (daily ed. Aug. 28, '1959).
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proviso to 8(b) (7) (C)), that section seeks to compel an election as a means
of resolving the union demands for organization and recognition.10° If the
union wins the election, -the employer must recognize it as the employees'
certified bargaining -representative. If the union loses, it is prohibited from
picketing for twelve months under subsection (B) of 8(b) (7). This policy
recognizes 'that picketing will normally be part of a bona fide organizing cam-
paign -by the union, and should not be summarily prohibited without first
allowing the union to prove its employee support.11 0
Under Taft-Hartley, an election could be put off indefinitely; the union it-
self did not have to file an election petition until it chose to, and the employer
could not precipitate an election unless the union had made a demand for recog-
nition.""' Moreover, the tortuous 9(c) election procedure could often consume
more than a year.1:2 If, therefore, the election was to be used under 8(b) (7)
to bring about a speedy resolution of the controversy, Congress had to make
two changes in the Taft-Hartley election procedure: first, the election must be
precipitated soon after picketing with a secondary effect begins; second, the
election petition must be expedited as rapidly as possible after it has been filed.
The first objective-precipitating the election-was accomplished by stating
in 8(b) (7) (C) that secondary-effect picketing would be enjoined
where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section
9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty
days from the commencement of such picketing." 3
The union is not required to file a 9(c) election petition, but the alternative
of being enjoined makes -it likely that the union will file. If picketing is en-
joined, the union becomes subject to a period of restraint much longer than the
twelve-month bar following a lost election. The temporary restraining order
will last out adjudication of the 8(b) (7) complaint before the Board and a
Court of Appeals (probably a year in spite of the priority of 8(b) (7) com-
109. Presumably 8(b) (7) (C) will be invoked only when 8(b) (7) (A) and 8(b) (7)
(B) cannot be applied, since these latter provisions would afford more immediate relief
from picketing than would 8(b) (7) (C).
110. The amendments adopted in the conference secure the right to engage in all
forms of organizational picketing up to the time of an election in which the em-
ployees can freely express their desires with respect to the choice of a bargaining
representative. When the picketing results in economic pressure through the refusal
of other employees to cross the picket line, the bill would require a prompt election.
105 CoNG. REc. 16413 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959) (Senator Kennedy).
111. Labor-Management Relations Act § 9(c) (1) (B), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (1) (B) (1958). The Board has been willing to find a demand for recognition
in the fact of recognitional picketing alone, without any express demand being made. See
Carter Mffg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1609 (1958) ; Francis Plating Co., 109 N.LR.B. 35 (1954);
Red Robin Stores, 108 N.L.R.B. 1318 (1954).
112. The average time for a § 9(c) election is 110 days. Report of the Advisory
Panel 355.
1.13. LMRDA § 704(c).
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plaints) ;114 following adjudication, a cease and desist order will issue, and the
statute does not limit the duration of that order. Therefore, an election petition
will probably be filed by the union within a month. The election may be
brought about even sooner if the employer or any affected employee can file
for an election. Legislative history suggests that they can, 11 and the NLRB
regulations so provide. 1
The speed in precipitating an election which is gained 'by allowing the em-
ployer to file on the first day of picketing might 'be rendered illusory if the
requirements of -subsection 9(c) (1) (B) governing employer initiation of a
9(c) election are carried over to elections under 8(b) (7) (C). Under that sec-
tion, an employer must prove that the union has demanded recognition.117
Even if the employer has some grounds for alleging a union "demand," the
union will no doubt contest the issue, necessitating an investigation and hear-
ing procedure which may delay the election as long as if the employer had
vaited for the union to file. Although the statute seems to incorporate these
requirements in 8(b) (7) (C) by referring to petitions "under section 9(c),"
the next clause provides that
when such a petition has been filed the Board shall dorthwith, without
regard to the provisions of 9(c) (1) or the absence of a showing of a sub-
stantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an election in
such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results
thereof .... 118
This clause would seem to say that the "demand" required in subsection 9(c)
(1) (B) is not necessary to initiate an election, and that the reference to peti-
tions "under 9(c)" is simply a general reference to the Board's statutory
authority to conduct representation elections. The propriety of 'this interpreta-
tion might be challenged, however, by noting that the phrase following the
general -suspension of 9(c) (1) specifically suspends 9(c) (1) (A)-the require-
ment that a union's election petition must show substantial employee sup-
port. 1 9 The absence of a specific reference to the employer's obligation to show
a "demand," the argument would run, indicates that this obligation continues
in force under 8(b)(7)(C) and that the general suspension of 9(c)(1) re-
quirements was not intended to suspend subsections (A) or (B). Otherwise,
114. See note 67 supra.
115. The purpose of the proviso to paragraph (C) of section 704(c) which states that
when such petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith direct an election, is to
enable an employer or the employees to obtain a prompt election,
105 CoNG. RFc. A8061-62 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1959) (Rep. Barden).
116. The Board regulations issued pursuant to 8(b) (7) (C) indicate that anyone who
could file a 9(c) petition can file. NLRB: Statements of Procedure, Rules and Regula-
tions, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. § 102.76 (Supp. 1960).
11.7. See note 111 supra.
118. LMRDA § 704(c).
119. The Board rules interpreting "substantial support" have required the union to
show 30% support. NLRB.: Statements of Procedure, Rules and Regulations, Series 8,
supra note 116, at § 101.18(a).
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the argument concludes, the specific reference to 9(c) (1) (A) in the following
clause would be surplusage. But the "surplusage" problem can be explained
by the fact that the "substantial interest" requirement of 9(c) (1) (A) had
been specifically incorporated in the Landrum-Griffin bill adopted by the
House ;120 in Tedrafting 8(b) (7) (C), the conferees probably felt compelled to
make it clear that that provision had been expressly rejected.
In sum, the statute should be interpreted to provide that either the employer
or the union may file a petition for election as soon as secondary-effect picket-
ing is begun. The fact of such picketing itself should be enough to support the
election petition; -the employer does not have to show a union demand for
recognition, and the union does not -have to demonstrate substantial interest.
Despite this withdrawal of the formal requirements for a petition, however,
Congress apparently meant to provide that the liberalities of the expedited
election should not be accorded to spurious election petitions,' and the new
Board regulations correspond by permitting the regional director to dismiss
unwarranted petitions even where picketing occurs.12 2
The second congressional objective--eliminating delay from the election pro-
cedure-was attacked in ,two ways. Relaxing the qualifications for filing an
election petition removed the necessity to hear and determine some preelection
questions, such as "demand for recognition" or "substantial interest." Not all
time consuming issues were waived, however. The Board must still determine
120. The Landrum-Griffin provision prohibited picketing (inter alia):
(C) where the labor organization cannot demonstrate that it has a sufficient
showing of interest on the part of the employees to support a petition for an elec-
tion under section 9(c), or
(D) where such picketing has been engaged in for a reasonable period of time
(not exceeding thirty days) and at the expiration of which period no petition under
section 9(c) has been filed.
105 CoG. Rmc. 14377 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1959).
121. Such being the problem dealt with, it %as not the intent that this proviso, which
was added in conference, should be used as a device or subterfuge by a picketing
union to bring about a prehearing or so-called quickie election.
Therefore, in all cases, it wvill be appropriate for the Board to investigate as to
whether a labor organization is using the picketing as a device simply to bring
about a prehearing election. Where the Board has reason to believe that this is the
intent of the petitioning labor organization, the Board will be under a duty to direct
.the petitioner to follow the provisions of section 9(c) (1), and to afford the oppor-
tunity for a hearing. The right to a hearing is a sacred right and it should not be
denied where such denial would lend support to a subterfuge.
105 CONG. Rmc. A8062 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1959) (Rep. Barden).
122. NLRB: Statements of Procedure, Rules and Regulations, Series 8, 29 C.F.R.
§102.80 (Supp. 1960). The Board has also sought to prevent abuse of the expedited elec-
tioa procedure by providing that it will be invoked only when a formal 8(b) (7) charge
has been filed. Id. § 102.76. For discussion of this policy, see Address by Board Member
John H. Fanning before the Fifteenth Annual Executive Management Institute on Per-
sonnel and Industrial Relations, Univ. of Rhode Island, May 5, 1960, reprinted in CCH
L.kB. L. REP. 1 50447 (1960).
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its jurisdiction.123 Subsection 8(b) (7) (C) provides that the election shall be
held "in such [bargaining] unit as the Board finds appropriate," indicating
that this issue will not be waived. And any allegations ,that the election was
unfair must be disposed of before the results can 'be certified.
The second way in which the 1959 amendments attempted to hurry the
election was to modify the procedures for resolving these remaining questions.
Subsection 8(b) (7) (C) orders the Board to direct an election "forthwith."
Remarkably devoid of specific content, "forthwith" may nevertheless be inter-
preted as a command to -the NLRB -to accord 8(b) (7) (C) elections priority
and to make -use of any available shortcut. Section 701 ('b) of the 1959 Act
furnishes some of these shortcuts. Amending section 3(b) of Taft-Hartley,
section 701 (,b) provides that the Board may delegate to regional directors its
power to determine the appropriate bargaining unit, to determine whether a
question of representation exists, and to direct and certify an election. 12 4 Prior
to this amendment, all such decisions were made by the Board without pre-
liminary disposition,'125 a source of great delay in election procedures. Under
this amendment, the Board may relegate itself to the role of an appellate tri-
bunal; the order of the regional director will not normally be stayed when
appeal is -taken,'126 thus allowing the election to proceed immediately. And by
providing that a regional director's adjudication of challenges to the election's
validity will not 'be stayed,,27 the amendment cuts short the postelection con-
test period during which 'the union may picket.
Another device for expediting the 8(b) (7) (C) election would be to defer
the 'hearing and final determination on the issue of an appropriate bargaining
unit until after the election -takes place. In many cases -the results of the elec-
tion will show that the union has lost regardless of which 'bargaining unit is
used. If the union wins, or may win, the appropriate unit can 'be determined
'by a 'hearing held after the election .'2 8 The Board is prohibited from adopting
this procedure by section 9(c) (1) ,120 'but it seems reasonable to read the clause
in 8(b) (7) (C) directing an election "without regard to the provisions of sec-
tion 9(c) (1)" as removing any barrier. At least one of the House conferees
believed that this procedure was contemplated under 8(b) (7) (C), for 'he re-
123. The Board's constitutional authority to hold the election is based upon a finding
that "a question of representation affecting commerce exists . . . ." Labor-Management
Relations Act § 9(c)(1), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1958).
124. LMRDA § 701 (b).
125. 13 NLRB 'ANN. REP. 7 (1948).
126. LMRDA § 701(b).
127. Ibid.
128. This view was advanced after passage of the 1959 amendments in Report of the
Advisory Panel at 342-43. Before enactment of § 9(c) (1) in 1947, the NLRB had used
the prehearing election procedure when the issues of the election were relatively simple.
10 NLRB ANN. REP. 15 (1945).
129. "If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of rep-
resentation exists, it shall direct an election. . . ." Labor-Management Relations Act §
9(c) (1), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1958).
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ferred to expedited elections as "prehearing elections."13 0 The Board regula-
-tons issued under section 8(b) (7) seem to adopt this procedure in part. After
investigation, the regional director shall hold an election forthwith unless he
determines that "the proceeding raises questions which should be decided by
the Board before election" ;131 presumably questions which do not merit Board
attention will be decided -by the regional director after the election.
-The statute fails to deal with a third potential delay in election procedures--
the Board xule, adopted pursuant to its rule-making power under section 9(c)
(1), -that an election will not be held if an unfair labor practice charge is pend-
ing and the charging party has not waived use of the charge as grounds to con-
test the election.132 This rule has been adopted -to avoid conducting elections
when there is a likelihood that they will be upset.5 3 Before the enactment of
8(b) (7), delaying the election to achieve administrative efficiency did not
offend any policy except the desire of speedy elections for their own sake. But
since speed in the election procedure now serves ,to implement the additional
policy of halting picketing which Congress has found objectionable, the Board
should 'eevaluate its rule in light of these new considerations. The risk of a
useless election may not now be sufficient reason to allow delays. Continued
application of the rule could give a picketing union an opportunity to gain
additional time by fabricating unfair labor .practice charges against the em-
ployer.
"Reasonable Time Not to Exceed Thirty Days"
The "reasonable time" limitation fixes the period during which a picketing
union may avoid an 8(b) (7) (C) charge by filing for an expedited election.
Once a "reasonable time" has elapsed, picketing at any time thereafter is vul-
nerable to an injunction. An employer could obtain an injunction even after
the union filed its 9(c) petition on the grounds that a "reasonable time" had
elapsed before the petition was filed. It will thus be crucial for union counsel
to be able to ascertain in advance and with reasonable certainty when the
"reasonable time" period expires. An ad hoc determination by the Board in
130. See note 121 mspra.
131. NLRB : Statements of Procedure, Rules and Regulations, Series 8, 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.77(b) (Supp. 1960). The prehearing election was upheld against objections of due
process in Local 1265, Dep't Store Employees v. Brown, 45 L.R.R.M. 3101 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 29, 1960).
132. 21 NLRB ANN. REP. 66 (1956). If the pending charge involves a § 8(a) (5)
unfair labor practice (employer refusal to bargain), the election will not be held until the
charge is adjudicated, regardless of waiver. Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.LR.B. 1365
(1954).
133. 22 NLRB ANN. REP. 50 (1957). The early NLRB rationalization of this rule
was the policy of not holding elections when there was reason to believe that the em-
ployees' free choice would be affected by the unfair practice. 7 NLRB ANN. REP. 56-57
(1942). The waiver rule indicates that pendency of a charge no longer raises the pre-
sumption of interference.
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each case would not seem -to afford adequate predictability and would be harsh
on picketing unions. The Board might conceivably rule that "reasonable time"
will invariably mean thirty days, no more no less, ,but such a mechanistic rule
would not seem warranted by the statute, which sets forth that period only as
an outer limit. One district court has indicated that the duration of '"reasonable
-time" will be -shortened if the picketing is violent, 3 4 thus using 8(b) (7) (C)
as a means of curbing picket line violence. This approach also seems incorrect,
for -the 8(b) (7) injunction would prohibit all further picketing, including
peaceful picketing, and thus seems to go too ,far in attacking the specific evil
of violence.' 3 5 Hence, it would seem preferable for the Board to define "rea-
sonable time" in the foreseeable classes of cases and to 'base these definitions
on indicia of the effectiveness of -the -picketing; the more effective the picket-
ing, the less time the union should be allowed to picket without filing a peti-
tion. The Board could, for example, declare that when picketing results in an
immediate shutdown because the employer's 'business depends upon daily de-
liveries, the union may only picket for, say, five days or ten days without filing
a petition for an expedited election.
Special problems of defining "reasonable time" may 'be expected in the case
of sporadic or intermittent picketing. Suppose the union employs secondary-
effect picketing for less than "a reasonable time" and then withdraws. If the
union later begins to picket, would such picketing start a new reasonable time
period running, or would reasonable time take into account the earlier picket-
ing as well? The reasonable-time provision does not seem ,limited by any re-
quirement -that picketing be on consecutive days, indicating that the Board
should 'hold the union to a total number of days of picketing, whether consecu-
tive or not. Reference -to past picketing might 'be restricted, 'however, 'by the
statute of limitations in section 10(b),130 so that picketing which occurred
more than six months 'before would 'be irrelevant. Some limitation seems ap-
propriate in view of the fact -that, after losing an election, the union can start
picketing with a clean slate after a year. But this cutoff device might not be
available if periodic picketing is categorized as a continuing unfair labor prac-
tice.137
134. Cuneo v. Shoe Workers, 45 L.R.R.M. 2822 (D.N.J. 1960). A union which filed
a petition for an election within ten days after picketing had commenced was 'held not to
have filed within a "reasonable time." Ten days was more than a reasonable time because
the picketing was accompanied by acts of "violence, coercion and intimidation."
135. See Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (1896) (Holmes,
J., dissenting). An 8(a) (1) complaint or state court action against violent picketing pre-
sumably would enjoin only -the violent picketing.
136. Labor-Management Relations Act § 10(b), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
160(b) (1958).
137. If the unfair labor practice is a "continuing" violation, § 10(b) is not a bar.
Bryan Mfg. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 502 (1957). However, it will not always be clear what




The Overlap Between 8(b)(7)(C) and tiw Sccondary Boycott Provision.s
Under Taft-Hartley, primary picketing with a secondary effect had in some
cases fallen within the prohibitions of section 8(b) (4) (A) of the secondary
boycott provisions. 3 8 If this section (now 8(b) (4) (B)) 139 continues to apply
-to such picketing despite the fact that the new section 8(b) (7) specifically
applies, in many cases the election procedures under 8(b) (7) (C) will be ren-
dered inoperative by the more restrictive remedies provided for in section 8 (b)
(4) (B). For example, 8(b) (7) (C) permits picketing, even when it has a
secondary effect, for a "reasonable time" and perhaps even longer when a peti-
tion for an election is filed within that time. But 8 (b) (4) (B) would invariably
subject picketing which falls within its proscriptions to immediate mandatory
injunction. 1" ° Also, 8(b) (4) (B) would, if applicable, allow an action against
the picketing union for damages.' 4 Finally, 8(b) (4) (B) can be invoked in
some cases where 8(b) (7) (C) is inapplicable; for example, under 8(b) (4)
(B) it is not necessary to prove that picketing actually stopped deliveries.1 2'4
Congress was aware of the overlap; the language of the statute suggests a
certain amount of indecision in solving the problem. The final clause of 8(b)
(7) suggests that the secondary boycott provisions would continue to be appli-
cable:
Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which
would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section 8(b) .'4
But the final clause of 8(b) (4) (B) seems to reject this implication by provid-
ing:
Nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlaw-
ful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picket-
ing.1 4
The House Managers' Report attempts to settle the matter by reading the
word "otherwise" in 8(b) (4) (B) to mean "previously":
The purpose of this provision is to make it clear that the changes in sec-
tion 8(b) (4) do not overrule or qualify the present rules of law permit-
ting picketing at the site of a primary labor dispute. This provision does
not eliminate, restrict, or modify the limitations on picketing at the site of
a primary labor dispute that are in existing law. See, for example, NLRB
v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, et al. (341 U.S. 675
(1951); Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, and Paper Hangers, etc.,
and Pittsburgh Plate ,Glass Co. (110 NLRB 455 (1954); loore Dry-
138. 61 Stat. 141. (1947) (now § 8(b) (4) (A), as amended, LMRDA § 704(a)).
139. 73 Stat 542-43 (1959).
140. Labor-Management Relations Act § 10(1), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160
(1) (1958).
141, Labor-Management Relations Act § 303, 61 Stat. 158-59 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187
(1958).
142. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
143. LMRDA § 704(c).
144. LMRDA § 704(a).
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dock Co. (81 NLRB 1108 [sic] ; Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works,
Inc. (107 NLRB [299] 1953)). 14 5
Thus -the 1959 amendments continue to subject some forms of primary picket-
ing -to the secondary-boycott provisions. To determine which forms of primary
picketing are -to be governed by 8(b) (4) (B) requires analysis of what the
report meant when it said "existing law."
The "existing law," developed under 8(b) (4) (A) of Taft-Hartley, had
originally distinguished between picketing which occurred at a "common situs"
-where employers other than the one picketed are working simultaneously,
such as a construction project or a vessel port-and picketing at a primary
situs-a situs primarily under the control of the picketed employer. In the
"common situs" cases, picketing of one employer usually 'had the effect of halt-
ing all work on the common situs. The Board decisions in these cases were
expressed in terms of whether the secondary effect of the picketing was only
an "incident" of picketing the primary employer, or whether the picketing was
actually directed -to the secondary employees with "an object" of halting their
work and thereby bringing the pressure of secondary employers to bear on the
primary employer. The Board approached this problem by formulating me-
chanical rules, articulated in the Moore Drydock and Washington Coca-Cola
cases. 14 To prove -bona fide picketing of a primary employer, the union had
to comply with these rules in order to establish that it had done everything
reasonably possible under the circumstances to minimize the impact of picket-
ing upon the secondary employees.
Initially, the Board doctrine was quite different when picketing occurred at
a primary situs. In Ryan Constr. Co. the Board developed a "title" theory of
picketing:
When picketing is wholly at the premises of the employer with whom the
union is engaged in a labor dispute, it cannot be called "secondary" even
though, as is virtually always the case, an object of the picketing is to dis-
suade all persons from entering such premises for business reasons. 147
But in recent years the Board has changed its view. In Crystal Palace the
majority expressed amazement that "the legality, of ...picketing should de-
pend on title -to property. '148 It was indicated that a union picketing a primary
145. Statement of the Maanuorers on the Part of the House, H.R. RL-'. No. 1147, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 704(a) (1959). Presumably the Managers meant the Moore Drydock
case, Sailor's Union (Moore Drydock), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
146. Sailor's Union (Moore Drydock), supra note 145; Local 67, Brewery Drivers
(Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works), 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953), aff'd, 220 F.2d 380
(D.C. Cir. 1955).
147. United Electrical Workers (Ryan Constr. Co.), 85 N.L.R.B. 417, 418 (1949).
The employer had erected a "separate gate" to be used only by secondary employees and
this gate was picketed by the union.
148. Local 1017, Retail Fruit Clerks (Crystal Palace Market), 116 N.L.R.B. 856, 859
(1956), aff'd, 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957).
[Vol. 69:13931426
SECTION 8(b)(7)
employer at his fixed premises must make a bona fide effort to minimize the
impact of its picketing on the operation of neutral employers.' 49 Implicit in
tis view was the notion that an employer's fixed premises are as much a
"common situs" as a construction project, because these premises are the situs
of secondary employers when they furnish goods and services to the primary
employer. In 1959, the Board expressly adopted this new position in the Gen-
eral Electric case,15 overruling Ryan Construction Co. A union picketing at
a primary situs was found to have violated 8(b) (4) (A) by placing pickets at
a separate gate used only by secondary employees. The majority opinion also
rejected use of the Moore Drydock criteria,l'" indicating that, at least in pri-
mary situs cases, it will look to the union's "object" and not to its compliance
with formalized rules. But whether this departure means that picketing at a
common entrance will also be scrutinized for "secondary" motives remains to
be determined in future decisions.
Arguably, it would be undesirable for the Board and courts to take advan-
tage of this state of flux in "existing law" to extend 8(b) (4) (B ) further into
the area now covered by 8(b) (7) (C). Congress apparently intended to limit
the impact of 8(b) (4) (B) upon "primary picketing." General Electric broad-
ly applied would erase any distinction between "primary picketing" and other
picketing. To the extent that 8(b) (4) (B) is enlarged to cover 8(b) (7) (C)
picketing, the union's right to engage in limited recognitional-organizational
picketing -with a secondary effect, so arduously defended in the Conference
Committee, would become devoid of meaning. On the other hand, the state-
ment in the House Manager's Report can be interpreted as only a disclaimer
Having modified sectiof 8(b) (4) to secure other objectives, 152 Congress did
not wish their changes to affect the developing common law of secondary boy-
cotts on the issue of primary situs picketing. Given a separate policy of impos-
ing greater restrictions upon concerted activity when it can be shown that the
union intends to interfere with secondary employers, the Board and the courts
should remain free to implement that policy whenever violations are dis-
covered.
ALLEN H. DUFFYt
149. Id. at 860-62.
150. Electrical Workers (General Electric), 123 N.L.R.B. No. 180, 44 LR.R.M. 1173
(1959).
151. The applicability of Moore Drydock criteria was asserted by the concurring
opinion of Member Fanning, 44 L.R.R.M. at 1175, but the majority did not adopt that
approach. _
There always seems to have been an irreconcilable difference between the Supreme
Court's analysis of the "object" of the picketing, NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951), and the Board's Moore Dr3dock and Washington Coca-
Cola rules. See Sales Drivers v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
152. For a discussion of the purposes of the modifications in § 8(b) (4) (A), see
Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Anendnents to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 1hhmN.
L. REv. 257, 270-74 (1959).
1Third-year student, Yale Law School.
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